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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

action, the credit of the state is not being loaned in the aid of any
individual corporation or association."
3. "The transaction does not result in an indebtedness on the part
of the state. Under the plan the only obligation entered into by anyone representing the State or with power to bind the State is the
obligation to pay the designated rent stipulated by the terms of the
lease running from the building corporation to the board of regents.
But for this purpose only, the proceeds arising from the operation of
the leased premises are to be applied upon the payment of the rent.
The regents are free at their election to abandon the plan of acquiring
or holding that which prior to the contract they did not own. (The land
was owned by the university.) The board of regents acquired an
interest in the property which it did not have. In purchasing that
property it does not pledge the general credit of the state. It pledges
to the payment for the property moneys acquired from the operation
of the property thus acquired."
4. As to the delegation of legislative powers to the board, the court
merely said, "that this was merely a duty imposed by the legislature
upon the board in order that the purpose of the statute might be
carried out."

MORGAN MALONEY

Constitutional Law: Due Process: Price-Fixing Legislation.
When supported and accelerated by a general public interest in the
matter which it seeks to control or regulate, police power knows nor
recognizes no law. But when that necessary element of "public interest" is lacking, police power is a cart sans wheels.
The instant case' presents a discussion of what constitutes a public interest of quality sufficient to warrant price fixing legislation.
Here a statute required all persons who sought to establish employment agencies to procure licenses from the commissioner of labor of
that state, providing a penalty for failure to do so. Applicants were
required to submit to the commissioner a schedule of fees which they
proposed to charge for services in the conduct of such agencies. The
commissioner of labor was empowered by the same statute to reject
applicants "for any good cause shown within the meaning of this act."
The case at hand was precipitated by the refusal of the commissioner
of labor to issue a license to the appellant on the sole ground that, in
his opinion, the proposed fees were exorbitant and unreasonable.
In reply to the appellant's contention that the attempt to confer upon
the commissioner of labor the power to fix prices in the manner described above contravenes the due process clause of the Constitution,
'Ribnik v. McBride, 48 S. Ct. Rep. 545.

NOTES AND COMMENT

the respondents urged that the business under consideration afforded
an especially fertile ground for the cultivation of the evils of extortion,
fraud, imposition, discrimination, and The like.
In arriving at its conclusion, the court considered these propositions:
It is granted that where businesses are devoted to public use, and the
public has an interest in the business, i.e., is vitally affected by the
operation of--such business, the legislature has the power to regulate
prices. 2 But the phrase "affected with the public interest" demands
careful consideration. The mere declaration by a legislature that a
business is affected with a public interest is not conclusive of the
question whether its attempted regulation on that ground is justified. 3
The circumstances which clothe a particular kind of business with a
public interest in fhe sense that the power to regulate prices follows,
must be such as to create a peculiarly close relation between the public
and those engaged in it, and raise implications of an affirmative obligation on their part to be reasonable in dealing with the public.4 So,
where Congress enacted a law fixing minimum wages for women and
children in the District of Columbia, it was held invalid insofar as it
affected women as an arbitrary interference with the right to contract
in respect of terms of private employment. 5 And also, where an act of
the New York Legislature sought to fix the price at which theater
tickets should be sold by a ticket broker, such act was held invalid.
The business of an employment agency is essentially a brokerage. There
is no substantial difference between a real estate broker, merchandise
broker, ticket broker, or employment broker as regards the character
of the several undertakings. In none of these pursuits, however, does
the interest of the public approach the interest the law contemplates
7
as the basis for legislative price control.
The evils attendant upon the operation of an employment agency
render it subject to regulation,but not to price fixing.8
STEWART G. HONECK
Equal Protection of the Laws: Constitutional Law: Classification.
The case of Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania arose thus:

A tax was placed upon the gross receipts of the Quaker City Cab
Co., a foreign corporation doing business in the State of Pennsylvania.
The statute read that every transportation company, foreign and

' Wolff

Co. v. Industrial Court, 262

U.S.

522.

'Idem.
'Idem.

v. Childrei'sHospital, 261 U.S. 525.
'Tysons and Brother v. Banton, supra.
'Wolff Co. v. Industrial Coui't, supra.
' Tysons and Brother v. Banton, supra.
148 Sup. Ct. 553.
'Adkins

